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Abstract. User generated media, and their influence on the information
individuals are exposed to, have the potential to affect political outcomes.
This is increasingly a focus for attention and concern. The British EU
membership referendum provided an opportunity for researchers to ex-
plore the nature and impact of the new infosphere in a politically charged
situation. This work contributes by reviewing websites that were linked
in a Brexit Tweet dataset of 13.2 million tweets, by 1.8 million distinct
users, collected in the run-up to the referendum. In this dataset, 480,000
users have been classified according to their “Brexit” vote intent. Find-
ings include that linked material on Twitter was mostly posted by those
in favour of leaving the EU. Mainstream news media had the great-
est impact in terms of number of links tweeted, with alternative media
and campaign sites appearing to a much lesser extent. Of the 15 most
linked mainstream media, half show a substantially greater appeal to
the leave camp, with two of them very much so. No mainstream me-
dia had a consistent appeal among remain supporters. Among the sites
that were highly favoured by one voter valence or the other, the leave
sites had by far the greatest impact in terms of number of appearances
in tweets. Remain-preferred sites were less linked, and dominated by ex-
plicit campaign sites. Leave-preferred sites were more numerously linked,
and dominated by mainstream and alternative media.
1 Introduction
“Post-truth politics” [6] and “weaponized relativism”1 describe strategies by
which misleading information can be used to shape debates, redirect attention
and sow confusion in order to influence political outcomes. In recent times,
concern has been raised about the opportunities social media may be creat-
ing for use of these strategies, and the consequent undermining of democracy.
Furthermore, social media can create a skewed or biased information environ-
ment that may affect voters’ perspectives. This has rightly become the focus
for research [20], which is starting to yield insights. The British EU membership
1 https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/mar/02/guardian-view-
russian-propaganda-truth-out-there
referendum (“Brexit”) provided an opportunity to explore the nature and extent
of social media impact in a politically charged situation.
In this work, we explore the informational materials that influenced the de-
bate about Brexit on Twitter. With the aim of deepening our understanding of
who exerted an influence in the run-up to the referendum, and how their influ-
ence played out, the work is organized around the following research questions:
RQ1: Who were the most prominent information sources in
the Brexit debate on Twitter? Specifically, what domains were most
linked?
RQ2: Is there evidence of differential media sharing patterns
between leave and remain supporters? In what ways are leave and
remain campaigns responding differently to opportunities afforded by
the Twitter medium? How are readers responding to materials?
RQ3: What influence has partisan and misleading material had?
Who is supplying biased material? How effective have these materials
been?
Key to the work presented here is a foundation of a list of around half a
million Twitter users accurately classified according to their Brexit vote intent;
“remainers” expressed or indicated their intention to vote for the UK to remain in
the EU, and “leavers”, their intention to vote “leave”. The work explores similar
territory to that covered by Faris et al [4], who analyze mainstream media and
asymmetries in the context of the 2016 US general election; we extend this with
a contrasting political scenario in a different country, and through our focus
on Twitter. Moore and Ramsay [15] analyse mainstream media behaviour in
the run-up to the referendum; our work builds on theirs by exploring how the
behaviour they discuss relates to a medium’s partisan appeal. Previous work
has also shared valuable evidence of Twitter partisan activity in the run-up to
the referendum [9, 16]; our voter classification enables us to bring an additional
perspective and rich possibilities for exploration of partisan dynamics.
The aggregate data on which this work is based are available for download.2
2 Related Work
The work presented here is set against a backdrop of increasing awareness of the
ways in which the internet and social media are changing society. Social media
have been widely observed to provide a platform for fringe views. Faris et al [4]
showed that social media seem to amplify more extreme views, with materials
linked on Twitter being more outre´ than the open web, and on Facebook even
2 http://www.dcs.shef.ac.uk/~genevieve/publications-materials/brexit-
domains-shared-materials.ods
more so, a finding echoed by Silverman [19]. Barbera´ and Rivero [2] and Preotiuc-
Pietro et al [18] both show that Twitter users with more ideologically extreme
positions post more content than those with moderate views.
Researchers also report consistent asymmetries in the way these changed
conditions play out. Allcott and Gentzkow [1], during the run-up to the 2016
US presidential election, found 115 pro-Trump fake news stories, which were
shared a total of 30 million times. They found 41 pro-Clinton fake news stories,
which were shared a total of 7.6 million times. This disparity is again echoed in
Silverman’s [19] work.
There is little evidence of a difference in the way information consumers of
different political valences respond to materials that might account for asymme-
try [4, 1]. Instead, Faris et al suggest that in the case of the 2016 presidential
election it was the cooperative behaviour of pro-Trump media themselves that
led to an advantage, in a phenomenon they dub “network propaganda”. This
raises questions about the reach of such a network or the conditions under which
it might arise elsewhere, and its relationship to political views if any.
A body of work [12, 13] has begun to explore Brexit opinion and sentiment
as expressed on Twitter. Howard and Kollanyi [9] share our interest in propa-
ganda, but their work concerns “bots” and the role of automated activity on
Twitter. Their group have also specifically investigated Russian involvement in
Brexit [16]. Bastos and Mercea [3] also study the impact of bot activity, and
present some observations about the nature of the content linked by the bots.
They state that such materials are likely to be user-generated, tabloid-style emo-
tionally orientated materials. Such work highlights the presence of organized at-
tempts to influence. Matsuo and Benoit 3 focus on differences in the dialogue
between leave and remain camps. Moore and Ramsay [15] also highlight differ-
ences in the tone of the different campaigns.
The role of Twitter misinformation in the context of the 2016 US presidential
election has attracted much research attention, as previously discussed. Less
research has reviewed similar situations in other countries. Ferrara [5] focuses
on the anti-Macron disinformation campaign in the run-up to the 2017 French
presidential election. A series of white papers from the Oxford Internet Institute
explore junk news and misinformation in a variety of countries’ elections [11, 10,
17, 7, 8]. Such work offers the opportunity to find patterns that extend beyond
local situations. This work forms a part of that effort.
3 Methodology
The basis of the work is a large collection of tweets collected using the GATE
Cloud Twitter Collector 4, a tool that allows tweets to be gathered according
to search criteria as they appear, and processed using GATE 5 text processing
3 http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2017/03/16/more-positive-assertive-and-
forward-looking-how-leave-won-twitter/
4 https://cloud.gate.ac.uk/shopfront/displayItem/twitter-collector
5 https://gate.ac.uk/
pipelines to enrich the tweets with relevant background information, including
the EU membership stance of the author. The method is described more fully
by Maynard et al [14]. In the next section we describe collecting the tweets, then
after that the user vote intent classification.
Throughout the work we make use of Partisanship Attention Score (PAS),
first introduced by Faris et al [4]. This metric is a simple ratio of the number of
times a source is linked by one valence of user, for example leavers, versus the
other valence. In this work we use “leave-PAS” to describe a PAS in which leave
linkers outnumber remain linkers, and “remain-PAS” to describe a PAS in which
remain linkers dominate. We have grouped sources into five sets; those in which
a PAS is greater than 30:1 (one leave set and one remain set), those in which the
PAS is greater than 3:1 (leave and remain) and those with a more balanced PAS
of less than 3:1. The 30:1 and 3:1 ratios were selected heuristically–throughout
the work we are careful to reflect on how that choice might affect the results.
3.1 Tweet Collection
Around 17.5 million tweets were collected up to and including 23 June 2016 (EU
referendum day). The highest volume was 2 million tweets on Jun 23rd (only
3,300 lost due to rate limiting), with just over 1.5 million during poll opening
times. Of the 2 million, 57% were retweets and 5% replies. June 22nd was second
highest, with 1.3 million tweets. The 17.5 million tweets were authored by just
over 2 million distinct Twitter users (2,016,896). The work presented here focuses
on a subset of these, covering the month up to and including June 23rd. Within
that period, there were just over 13.2 million tweets, from which 4.5 million
were original tweets (4,594,948), 7.7 million were retweets (7,767,726) and 850
thousand were replies (858,492). These were sent by just over 1.8 million distinct
users. The tweets were collected based on the following keywords and hashtags:
votein, yestoeu, leaveeu, beleave, EU referendum, voteremain, bremain, no2eu,
betteroffout, strongerin, euref, betteroffin, eureferendum, yes2eu, voteleave, vote-
out, notoeu, eureform, ukineu, britainout, brexit, leadnotleave. These were chosen
for being the main hashtags, and are broadly balanced across remain and leave
hashtags, though the ultimate test of the balance of the dataset lies in the num-
ber of leavers and remainers found in it, which is discussed below.
Most URLs found in tweets have been shortened, either automatically by
Twitter or manually by the user, which has the side effect of obfuscating the
original domain being linked to. For this work we expanded the URLs in tweets
using the following approach. From manual analysis of the URLs we accumulated
a list of 18 URL shorteners or redirect services: shr.gs, bit.ly, j.mp, ow.ly, trib.al,
tinyurl.com, ift.tt, ln.is, dlvr.it, t.co, feeds.feedburner.com, redirect.viglink.com,
feedproxy.google.com, news.google.com, www.bing.com, linkis.com, goo.gl, and
adf.ly. All URLs from other domains were considered to already be expanded. (A
small number of minor URL shorteners have gone unexpanded due to the long
tail in this large tweet set and the necessity of manually identifying shortening
services.) When we saw a shortened URL it was expanded, either by following
HTTP redirects or using the API of the shortener, recursively until the resulting
URL no longer pointed to a domain in our list of shorteners.
3.2 User Vote Intent Classification
Classification of users according to vote intent was done on the basis of tweets
authored by them and identified as being in favour of leaving or remaining in the
EU. Such tweets were identified using 59 hashtags indicating allegiance, given in
the online experimental materials6. Hashtags in the final position more reliably
summarise the tweeter’s position, so only these were used. Consider, for example.
“is Britain really #strongerin? I don’t think so! #voteleave”.
This approach was evaluated using a set of users that explicitly declared their
vote intent. A company called Brndstr7 ran a campaign offering a topical profile
image modification in response to a formulaic vote intent declaration mentioning
their brand. This enabled a ground truth sample to be easily and accurately
gathered. On these data, we found our method produced a 94% accuracy even
on the basis of a single partisan tweet (where three are required, an accuracy of
99% can be obtained, though only 60,000 such users can be found, as opposed
to 290,000 with at least one partisan tweet). The Brndstr data itself, consisting
of around 100,000 users of each valence, was also used to supplement the set,
raising the accuracy further, and resulting in a list of 208,113 leave voters and
270,246 remain voters. Table 1 gives detailed statistics for three conditions; one
matching tweet found for that user, two found or three found. Total is the total
number of users found with that number of matching tweets. Brndstr found is
the number of those users found in the Brndstr set, and so able to be evaluated.
The remaining figures refer to that set, providing an accuracy for the total list
of users found using the given minimum number of partisan tweets.
There may be a case for using a threshold of two hashtags in order to produce
a more balanced set of leavers and remainers, but this would disproportionately
exclude remainers with more moderate feelings (if the number of hashtags can
be seen as an indicator of this). The resulting set is somewhat slanted toward
remainers, demonstrating the obvious; that Twitter isn’t a representative sample
of the UK population, who voted to leave the EU to the order of 52%. However,
leavers were more vocal and apparent in the data presented below, contrary to
what we would expect if the higher number of remainers had affected the result.
It is possible that some users changed their mind about how to vote after making
their Brndstr declaration, but the work can nonetheless be seen as an exploration
of the behaviour of those who held a particular allegiance during the time period
studied. Furthermore, voters making an online declaration of their vote intent
are perhaps those less likely to vacillate.
6 http://www.dcs.shef.ac.uk/~genevieve/publications-materials/brexit-
domains-shared-materials.ods
7 http://www.brndstr.com/
Total Brndstr Of found Accuracy Cohen’s kappa
found correct
Leavers, 3# 34539 1142 1129 0.987 0.972
Remainers, 3# 26674 603 594
Leavers, 2# 49080 1368 1350 0.984 0.966
Remainers, 2# 50972 901 882
Leavers, 1# 114519 1935 1801 0.943 0.885
Remainers, 1# 175042 1744 1667
Table 1: Brexit Classifier Accuracy
4 RQ1: Who were the most prominent information
sources in the Brexit debate on Twitter?
Across the whole corpus, the top 100 most posted domains were manually
grouped into high level categories, and the number of links in tweets to do-
mains in each category are shown in figure 1. The dominant domain to appear
was Twitter itself, appearing whenever anyone posts an image, as well as when
they link to another tweet. After that, the greater proportion of the links are
to items in a wide variety of mainstream news media. “Other content hosts”
refers to smaller content platforms such as Instagram; YouTube and Facebook
are listed separately. Finally, smaller amounts of material are linked from ref-
erendum campaign sites and alternative media. (Alternative media range from
publications that are nearly mainstream through to conspiracy sites and fake
news.) The “long tail” of a further 17,000 less linked domains that haven’t been
manually classified are included in the chart to give a quantification of the un-
known; note that this unknown section is likely to contain many more small
alternative media, blogs etc. than mainstream media. Also only domains that
were tweeted at least once by a user that has been classified for vote intent were
included. The actual number of domains mentioned in the set is much greater.
The graph broadly corresponds with to table 1 of Narayanan et al [16]. We are
also able divide each count into three parts, indicating the proportion of tweets in
that section by unclassified users, remainers and leavers. It is evident at a glance
that remainers were tweeting less linked material, since their representation is
smaller. Also there were fewer remainers in the unclassified tail (that is, the
column of unclassified sites, not the unclassified users), suggesting perhaps a
preference for more popular sites on the part of remainers. It is unknown how
many leavers, remainers and undecideds constitute the unclassified users (the
grey bottom section of the columns) but there’s no particular reason why the
classified users wouldn’t give a representative impression.
Figure 2 shows the sites that had the most impact, in terms of total num-
ber of times they appeared in tweets in the Brexit dataset. These were almost
entirely mainstream media, mostly UK media, with the exception of the remain
campaign site “ukstronger.in” and the UK government domain. The graph gives
Fig. 1: Types of links posted
total counts of appearances of the most influential domains, colour coded by par-
tisanship attention score (PAS); the ratio of links from leave voters to remain
voters or vice versa. Platforms such as Facebook, where the site doesn’t author
the content, are excluded. Only link appearances in original tweets are used in
this graph (not appearances in retweets or replies). Tables 2 and 3 in appendix 8
give a longer list of sites. The full set is also available for download 8
On page 13 of Moore and Ramsay [15] a similar graph shows the number
of referendum-related articles published by UK media. The number of Brexit
articles published by a medium shows a strong correlation to its link presence
on Twitter (0.71). In fact, the Express has been somewhat less taken up on
Twitter than its engagement with the subject might predict; figure 4 and its
discussion later in the paper may offer further insights on this point.
RQ1 Discussion It is evident that mainstream media were the dominant source
of linked materials in the Brexit discussion on Twitter, with the six most influ-
ential domains all being British mainstream media as shown in figure 2. Smaller
in influence but nonetheless significant were alternative media, with Breitbart
appearing in ninth place in figure 2, user-shared content on other content plat-
forms such as Facebook, and campaign sites. This suggests a continuing impor-
tant role for traditional media, though leaves questions about how social media,
and indeed alternative media, may interact to popularize certain materials and
influence the focus. It is also apparent that the most popular media were either
neutral in their appeal or appealed to leavers, with only two smaller sources,
the government and the “Stronger In” campaign, appealing to remainers. This
subject is taken up more fully in the next section.
8 http://www.dcs.shef.ac.uk/~genevieve/publications-materials/brexit-
domains-shared-materials.ods
Fig. 2: Number of appearances of high impact sites
5 RQ2: Is there evidence of differential media sharing
patterns between leave and remain supporters?
Figure 3a shows British mainstream newspapers ranked from left to right in order
of their leave PAS ratio (ratio of appearances in leave tweets against appearances
in remain tweets). PAS ratio is shown on the graph; however, for those media
with negative leave PAS ratios, the remain PAS ratio has been plotted (ratio of
appearances in remain tweets against those in leave tweets). In this way, both
leave and remain media can be shown commensurately on the same graph. The
point at which the PAS ratios switch direction is indicated with a vertical dashed
line. The extreme right of the graph, therefore, shows the newspaper with the
highest remain PAS ratio (The Guardian/Observer combined). Two horizontal
lines indicate PAS ratios of 3:1 and 30:1. PAS ratios for link appearances in all
tweets and just original tweets are shown.
Several British newspapers declared their allegiances regarding Brexit, re-
portedly giving media supporting the UK leaving the EU an audience of around
4.8 million, while those in favour of remaining in the EU reach just over 3
million 9. Stance information is included in Figure 3a in the form of coloured
marks–a blue diamond for leave and a red circle for remain. Both marks appear
for the Mail because the Daily Mail shares its domain with the Mail on Sunday.
The Daily Mail were in favour of leaving the EU, and the Mail on Sunday, with
a slightly lower circulation, were in favour of remaining. Several other domains
include the Sunday edition of the newspaper, but only in the case of the Mail do
these have different Brexit stances. The Times and the Standard appear with
9 https://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/entry/which-newspapers-support-
brexit_uk_5768fad2e4b0a4f99adc6525
leave PAS scores (to the left of the dashed line) despite a remain allegiance. The
PAS scores however are low, indicating a balanced appeal.
Fig. 3: PAS (a) and Press Complaints (b) for UK Mainstream News Media
There are various explanations for why remain media materials might have
a lower PAS, indicating appeal to both sides of the debate. In order to gather
more information about the nature of the materials linked, and the extent of
their partisanship, press complaints about stories that could impact on voters’
feelings about EU membership in the months preceding the referendum were
examined. Figure 3b provides this information, in a graph in which media are
ordered according to their PAS, to match the preceding graph. Cases where a
story appeared in print and online are counted one time only. The green line
indicates the number of upheld press complaints for that medium. The purple
line also includes the number of complaints for which a resolution was found. The
majority of press complaints were anti-immigration in their focus. The graph also
includes an orange dashed line plotting data taken from Moore and Ramsay [15].
They provide data about the number of leave and remain front pages published
by media in the weeks leading up to the referendum. The number plotted (“bias”)
is the magnitude of number of leave front pages minus number of remain front
pages, as shown in the equation below. The point at which the number flips
from indicating leave bias to remain bias is again indicated with a dashed line
on the graph. Zero-scoring media are those for which Moore and Ramsay do not
provide statistics.
bias =
√
(leave− remain)2
Figure 4 presents counts of sites according to their PAS status. A threshold of
20 total original tweets by leavers and remainers was applied, in order to exclude
sites for which too little evidence was available to classify them. The graph
shows peaks to either extreme, despite the stringent 30:1 criterion, reinforcing
previous researchers’ findings that extreme content tends to proliferate on social
media [4, 19, 2, 18]. On the right we see the actual link counts to the sites. Twitter
mentions have not been included, since they give a large, uninformative boost
to the neutral count. Were other content-neutral platforms to be excluded, this
count would be lower still. (Table 2 in appendix 8 gives the top 20 sites in each
PAS category, in terms of total links; a number of content neutral platforms can
be seen there to illustrate the point). This conflation of content-neutral with
ideologically neutral does not affect the observation that the extremes no longer
outnumber the moderate sites. It seems most Twitter users prefer less extreme
materials of those on offer; a suggestion that would also explain the Express being
somewhat less popular than its Brexit engagement would seem to warrant, as
discussed above.
RQ2 Discussion The data have shown that all of the media that declared their
support for the remain cause were broadly neutral in their appeal, with the
exception of the Guardian/Observer, who, when retweets and replies are counted,
has a leave PAS greater than 3:1. The media that declared their official support
for leave all to varying extent appealed more to leavers. This brings to mind
Faris et al’s [4] conclusion from their study of the 2016 US presidential election
that mainstream media ranging from left to centre right show more investment
in principles of neutrality. The Brexit question cut across the political spectrum,
although in terms of media stance, the left-leaning papers favoured remain and
the right, leave. However, it is also possible that leavers engaged with remain
Fig. 4: All domains vs total mentions by PAS of domain
materials for other reasons. In order to gather more data, we reviewed press
complaints data, and also compared front page partisanship data from Moore
and Ramsay [15]. It is interesting to note that PAS seems to echo upheld press
complaints better than it does partisanship as indicated by front pages. There
are prominent cases where media published many stories in keeping with their
Brexit stance, but without attracting press complaints; namely the Telegraph
and the Guardian. Materials supportive of a particular stance don’t per se seem
to draw partisan attention–the PAS of both these media is low.
This is important in correctly interpreting figure 2. The medium with the
biggest impact is the Guardian, which published many pro-remain articles. So
in this sense, there wasn’t a lack of attention to pro-remain materials, and if the
colour coding of the graph were based on the “front page diff” used above, the
impression created would be quite different. PAS captures something different.
Manual review of the tweets suggests that Guardian articles tend to be factual
in tone, and attract critical engagement from leavers. Express articles tend to
use emotive and suggestive language, and seem to attract less discussion. Moore
and Ramsay’s analysis [15] gives much information about the rhetorical styles
employed by the press in the run-up to the referendum. Circulation size does not
explain the number of complaints received, with the Express having less than
half the readership of any of the four largest media.10
6 RQ3: What influence has partisan and misleading
material had?
We saw in section 5 that high PAS scores broadly correspond with upheld press
complaints, and that polarity of PAS is a good indicator of the stance of the
source, as determined from press front pages. In this section we use PAS scores
10 http://www.pressgazette.co.uk/nrs-national-press-readership-
data-telegraph-overtakes-guardian-as-most-read-quality-title-in-
printonline/
of greater than 30:1 to select sources that may be misleading for further exam-
ination. Sites of either camp with at least 1000 total mentions in tweets in the
dataset and at least 50 tweets, retweets or replies by leavers or remainers were
manually analysed. We present the sites divided into 4 categories; mainstream
media, alternative media, campaign sites and other sites. “Others” includes for
example personal blogs or special interest websites not primarily focused on
Brexit.
Figure 5 shows that remain PAS>30:1 sites are dominated by explicit cam-
paign sites. As we would expect given the data above, among leave influencers
we see more mainstream media–note that the only high PAS mainstream me-
dia were leave media; namely the Express. We also see a much greater role for
alternative media in the leave campaign. The total impact of leave PAS>30:1
media was 389,000 mentions. For remain it was 70146 mentions, or 18% of the
PAS>30:1 impact. All sites with a PAS higher than 30:1 and more than 5000
mentions are shown in figure 6. The Express dominates, with the US alternative
medium Breitbart in second place. As indicated above, remain sites are mainly
campaign sites. Other leave sites are media ranging from alternative to con-
spiracy, plus the campaign site “voteleavetakecontrol.org”. A longer list can be
found in table 3 in appendix 8.
Fig. 5: Who are the PAS>30:1 influencers?
The press complaints data provides another opportunity to review updake
of partisan material. The impact of the misleading articles, at least on Twitter,
Fig. 6: Who are the PAS>30:1 sites?
seems to be relatively minor. By far the most mentioned was the claim that “the
Queen backs Brexit”, receiving 2969 textual mentions, including 180 retweets of
a Russian troll account, despite having run before data began to be collected,
making data incomplete. The next most widely mentioned misleading headline
was mentioned 199 times only. In contrast, the exonerated article “Far Right in
Plot to Hijack Brexit” was the most mentioned remain headline among the press
complaints, and was mentioned in text 235 times. Previous research has sug-
gested that false rumours spread faster than true ones [21]. Claims that shaped
the referendum debate offer another contrast case. Particularly prominent was
leave’s claim that the EU costs the UK £350 million each week. A claim was
also made by George Osborne, the then Chancellor, in favour of remain; namely
that leaving the EU could cost households £4,300 per year by 2030. In our data,
the remain claim appeared 9510 times in tweet text. The leave claim appeared
32755 times in text. Moore and Ramsay [15] state that the remain claim was
discussed in 365 newspaper articles, whereas the leave claim was discussed in
only 147. The greater media interest in the Osborne claim is unsurprising given
his position of authority, but this didn’t translate into interest on Twitter. The
appearance of the leave claim on the side of a bus perhaps proved compelling,
appearing in photographs 900 times in our data.
RQ3 Discussion Key observations from figure 5 include that in terms of mentions
in tweets, the influence of leave sites dwarfs that of remain sites. It is also notable
in that figure that high remain-PAS sites were mostly explicit campaign sites;
in other words, openly partisan, with no suggestion of providing reportage. The
range of media providing high leave-PAS materials, plus the presence of Breitbart
raises the question of whether these findings demonstrate a similar phenomenon
happening in the UK as described by Faris et al, or whether indeed it is simply
the same phenomenon - an extension of the same network of propaganda.
7 Conclusion
Websites linked in topically related tweets during the run-up to the 2016 UK EU
membership election were most often neutral or bipartisan in their appeal. How-
ever, sources with partisan appeal also captured a sizeable portion of the debate,
and of those, the leave-partisan materials were much more heavily propagated.
Materials with a strong appeal to leavers rather than remainers were plentiful
and diverse, and included mainstream media and alternative media including
US and other foreign sources. Materials with a strong appeal to remainers were
fewer and less influential, and mainly comprised explicit campaign sites.
Mainstream media with a stated remain stance produced materials appealing
to both sides of the debate. Some mainstream media with a stated leave stance
produced materials predominantly appealing to leavers. Number of upheld press
complaints shows a stronger resemblance to a site’s partisan appeal than the bias
of the source as determined by its number of pro-leave front pages or its stated
stance, suggesting that partisan appeal is capturing something other than the
extent to which a source provides a voice for a particular opinion, and that mis-
information may be a part of it. However, since the sample is small, the evidence
is somewhat anecdotal. On the other hand, on the remain side, the campaign
site “ukstronger.in” also showed a highly partisan appeal. One explanation for
differential appeal might lie in the extent to which certain behaviours, for ex-
ample the suggestion of entrenched opinion, discourage debate. Examination of
the tweets shows for example that the pro-remain Guardian attracted interest in
the form of critical comment, which the Express did not do to the same extent.
Whilst highly partisan materials are of concern in that they may be more often
more misleading, and are attracting significant attention, information consumers
did show a preference for linking more moderate materials, which supports the
suggestion that they may be encouraging discussion to a greater extent.
Data show some support for Faris et al ’s [4] hypothesis of network propa-
ganda, in that a vocal anti-immigration narrative emerged, and it is possible
that congruence of message accounted for the greater interest in leave materials
of high partisan appeal. However, further work would be required to investigate
this as there are many other possible explanations.
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A Most Linked Websites
Remain PAS>3:1 Total Neutral Total Leave PAS>3:1 Total
gov.uk 63119 twitter.com 4018371 Youtube 226382
theconversation.com 8495 The Guardian 253474 The Telegraph 148565
internacional.elpais.com 6915 BBC 242131 Daily Mail 86888
blogs.lse.ac.uk 6532 Facebook 109552 Bloomberg 53071
jkrowling.com 5975 The Independent 104572 news.sky.com 32016
economist.com 5220 amp.twimg.com 80727 The Sun 30255
eureferendum.gov.uk 4095 Reuters 71776 snpy.tv 28281
timeshighereducation.com 3738 wp.me 58287 Russia Today 23064
politics.co.uk 3344 Financial Times 44497 cnn.it 22617
politicalscrapbook.net 3266 mirror.co.uk 43467 on.wsj.com 20332
secure.avaaz.org 3159 buff.ly 40646 itv.com 17200
leftfootforward.org 3014 paper.li 39458 on.mktw.net 16838
touchstoneblog.org.uk 2655 New York Times 38441 blogs.spectator.co.uk 13298
zeit.de 2476 Huffington Post 33697 cnb.cx 12946
snp.org 2455 econ.st 29956 forbes.com 11967
tagesschau.de 2396 The Times 25519 yhoo.it 7955
cer.org.uk 2216 cards.twitter.com 21589 Sputnik 7032
greenpeace.org.uk 2078 standard.co.uk 15335 reportuk.org 6712
lavanguardia.com 2049 instagram.com 14671 International Business Times 6577
birminghammail.co.uk 1856 El Economista 13665 marketwatch.com 6090
Table 2: PAS>3:1 Sites and Sites with Neutral Appeal
Remain PAS>30:1 Total Leave PAS>30:1 Total
ukstronger.in 39221 express.co.uk 168846
prt.news 20452 breitbart.com 55493
virg.in 11708 zerohedge.com 20531
strongerin.co.uk 10672 Heat Street 14889
infacts.org 8165 voteleavetakecontrol.org 14235
ebx.sh 4670 order-order.com 12804
voteremain.win 2567 infowars.com 7306
unite4europe.org 1554 to-go.xyz 6107
owl.li 1462 dld.bz 5561
energydesk.greenpeace.org 1169 guyfawk.es 5072
scotlandineurope.eu 1166 specc.ie 4709
weareeurope.org.uk 1151 telegraaf.nl 4659
realnewsuk.com 1070 dailysquib.co.uk 4396
euromove.org.uk 968 davidicke.com 4184
bmj.com 900 twibble.io 4138
neweuropeans.net 788 brexitthemovie.com 3997
greens.scot 741 eureferendum.com 3673
richardcorbett.org.uk 712 au.news.yahoo.com 3447
uktostay.eu 696 indiegogo.com 3369
chokkablog.blogspot.co.uk 691 live.pollstation.com 3269
Table 3: PAS>30:1 Sites
